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Summary  findings
L6pez, Nash, and Stanton report rhe results of a study of  landholdings increased, the average farmer received
Mexican farm households using 1991 survey data and a  more credit (in real terms), more farm households earned
smaller resurvey of some of the same households in  income from off-farm work, and more farmers used
1993.  purchased inputs. Asset ownership and educational
One study goal was to empirically examine the  attainment also improved modestly.
relationship  between assets and the output supply  The very small low-Cl group in this sample fared as
function. Using a production  model focusing on capital  well as, or better than, the other groups. True, their level
as a productive input, they found that both the supply  of educational achievement fell, and fewer of them had
level and the responsiveness (elasticities) to changing  off-farm income than in 1991. But their use of credit,
input and output prices tend to depend on the farmer's  irrigation, machinery, and purchased inputs increased
net assets and on how productive assets are used.  more than for other groups.
Regression analysis using data from the surveys shows  The limited data are not proof of a causal link, but the
that farmers who use productive assets such as machinery  fact that the goals are being met should at least ensure
tend to be positively responsive to price changes, while  that adverse conditions are not undermining reform.
those with no access to such assets are not.  Farmers that lacked access to productive assets did not
Another study goal was to monitor the condition of  respond as well to incentives or take advantage of the
Mexican farmers in a rapidly changing policy  opportunities presented by reform and may need
environment. The 1991 survey data suggest that  farmers  assistance, particularly to get access to credit markets.
with more limited use of capital inputs (the "low-CI"  There may be a good argument for decoupling income
group) were more likely to grow principally corn and to  supports from price supports for farmers, since income
grow fewer crops, on average, than the others. They also  payments that are independent  of the vagaries of
had more problems getting credit and were less likely to  production  could provide a more stable signal of
use purchased inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, and  creditvorthiness  than price supports do.
pesticides, or to use a tractor to prepare the soil. They  Possibly  reorienring research and extension services
tended to be less well-educated, and their land tended to  more to the needs of low-Cl producers could also
be of lower quality.  improve the efficiency with which the sector adjusts to
Results from the panel data showed conditions  new incentives.
generally improving for the average farmer in the sample  Hypotheses and tentative conclusions from this study
area between 1991 and  1993, during a period when  will be explored further when more data are collected in
agricultural reforms were implemented. Cropping  1995.
patterns were more diversified, the average size of
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I.1 Background: Recent and planned reforms in trade and agricultural  policy
The Mexican economy  has become  increasingly  open over the last eight years.  Since
mid-1985,  when almost all imports were subject  to controls, protection has declined
dramatically.  Almost all imports are now free from controls, and the maximum  tariff now is
only 20 percent.  Mexico acceded to the GATT in 1986, and recently completed negotiations
for the North American Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA), further institutionalizing  its
commitment  to trade policy reform.
Until recently, however, the agricultural  sector has been a prominent  exception to the
trade liberalization. Imports of maize, beans, wheat, and barley still require licenses and
their levels of protection  have remained  high. The large devaluation  of 1994-95,  combined
with support prices fixed in nominal  terms, have reduced the level of domestic (support and
"agreement")  prices vis-a-vis  border prices, but an increase  in these domestic  prices is under
discussion. One obstacle  to liberalizing  the grain markets has been the fact that, although  the
poorest farmers are not net sellers, many poor rainfed farmers outside the subsistence  sector
rely on these commodities. In addition, a fall in grain prices could reduce the demand of
rural labor by large farmers, thereby lowering the wages of the households  who are net
sellers of labor.Thus, it has been feared that a reduction  in protection could significantly
increase the incidence  and severity of rural poverty.  Politically  powerful large-scale farmers
also have benefitted from this protection and opposed liberalization. These obstacles
notwithstanding,  the Mexican  government  is considering  moving  even faster than required by
NAFTA to liberalize  the agricultural  trade regime. It has announced that under the Programa
-1-Nacional de Modernization  del Campo (PROCAMPO),  most restrictions  on agricultural  trade
will be eliminated, with income support payments  to farmers based on historical  (not current)
production patterns and volumes. These payments  would then be phased out over a 15-year
period.  The first steps in PROCAMPO  began in 1993, but the large-scale delinkage  of price
and income support is now scheduled  for Spring 1996.
In addition  to these significant  changes in output markets that have occurred or are
imminent, Mexican farmers also are being faced with monumental  changes in input markets.
Subsidies  have been virtually eliminated  for fertilizer use and the former parastatal monopoly
on marketing  has been opened  to competition. Subsidies  on electricity (used for irrigation
pumps) and surface irrigation water have been reduced.  Imports  of agricultural  machinery,
which were restricted in order to protect domestic manufacturers,  have been liberalized, as
has the market for pesticides.
Changes in rural financial  markets have reflected the on-going restructuring  of the
whole financial  sector in Mexico. In 1988 and 1989, limits on commercial  bank lending to
the private sector were first partially relaxed, then eliminated. Following this, the
government  removed other controls, such as interest rate caps and forced lending quotas. By
July 1992, the commercial  banking system was privatized. However, the reforms have not
had as much effect in the rural sector as in others.  Controlled  on-lending interest rates,
combined with subsidized  credit guarantees  and agricultural  insurance, continue  to require
large government  transfers (though  not as large as in the past), and to impede the entry into
the market by private institutions. Poor farmers still face restricted access to credit, though
the previous practice on the part of  governmental  banks of only making loans for specific
-2-crops and specific  input packages (Heath, 1990) is being phased out.
In the land market, recent reforms have been truly fundamental. Much of Mexican
agriculture has been organized since the revolution  as "ejidos", organizations  of farmers,
each of whom may have usufruct rights to parcels of land, but not other ownership rights.
Thus, they have been unable to pledge land as collateral, making them potentially  poorer
risks for lending than those with ownership  rights. (This was one major raison d'etre for
government  rural banks.)  This system also limited the incentives for investment  in land
improvements  and impeded  the consolidation  of inefficiently  small plots.  In early 1992, the
Constitution  and applicable  laws were amended to give ejidatarios  much greater flexibility.
In principle, they will now be able to rent land, enter into joint ventures with outsiders, sell
land to members of the ejido, or sell it to non-members  with the approval of a majority of
ejido members.  Land can now be pledged as collateral. All of these changes are intended to
encourage  the development  of dynamic  rural land and financial  markets.  However, these
changes have been slow to be made operational. Only some of the ejidos have been given
"certificates  of ejido rights" (20 percent in early 1995, with another 50 percent in process),
and even fewer have received full private title (de Janvry, e.  al.,  1995).
1.2. The purpose of this study
The economic  environment  in rural Mexico, as in the rest of the country, has
undergone  wrenching  change in the recent past, with more change yet to come.  This mirrors
the situation  in many other reforming countries, though the changes in Mexico are arguably
among the most revolutionary  in the world, at least outside of the economies  in transition
-3-from socialism. Two major questions  facing the governments  of reforming countries are
whether citizens are able to readily avail themselves  of the opportunities  presented by the
changes, and if not, what policies are needed to facilitate  this?  These issues are especially
critical for the poor, both because they may be less capable than others of adapting  to
changes and because the consequences  of non-adaptation  may be more severe.
This study has two purposes.  One is to monitor the condition of Mexican  farmers,
especially  the poor, and see how changes in the economic  environment  have affected them.
While it will not be possible  to prove a causal link between any particular reforms and the
changes in practices or circumstances,  we will be able to tell if these changes are consistent
with the goals of the reforms. This monitoring  is important  in itself, since if the goals are not
being met, it may signal the need to investigate  why and to take corrective measures (e.g.,
accelerating  or fine-tuning  the reforms, or responding  to obstacles  to implementation). One
lesson of adjustment  experience  in many countries is that sustainability  is increased when
there is the perception  that reforms are having  a pay-off.  In establishing  this perception, the
counterfactual  (whether things would have been better or worse without the reform) matters
less than whether the goals are being met.
The second purpose of this study is to investigate  questions  related to constraints on
the ability of the poor to adjust. The myth that farmers in general fail to respond to
changing  incentive structures  has long ago been discarded. They are neither ignorant nor
tradition-bound,  and can adjust their inputs, outputs, and mix of activities (both on- and off-
farm) in response  to changing  circumstances.
However, there are several reasons that lead one to expect that poor farmers may be
-4-less price responsive  than others and, therefore, that both during the transition and in the
new less static market environment,  poor farmers may be less able than others to take
advantage  of opportunities.
First, poor farmers are more likely to face credit constraints due, in part, to lack of
collateral  availability. Second, poor farmers are likely to be constrained  by their low-quality
natural resources, particularly  land, which limits the range of crops that can be efficiently
grown.  Some land could be improved via erosion control, improved  fertilizers, access to
irrigation, or use of fallow periods, but these options require resources that the poor farmers
generally do not have, and also take time to implement. Thus poor farmers may be unable
to change their crop and production  techniques.
Third, unlike large farms which may face an essentially  elastic supply of hired labor,
small farms are more likely to depend on family labor which has few alternatives  and which
therefore can be considered quasi-fixed. Without  much flexibility  in hiring labor, these
farmers may be expected  to exhibit less price responsiveness. Fourth, the average  poor
farmer has achieved a lower level of formal education  than other farmers.  Without the skills
needed to adopt new crops and production techniques  or to move into non-agricultural
activities, farmers may face a drop in income with any adverse change in relative prices.
Finally, poor farmers by definition  lack a reserve of financial  resources for adjusting to
shocks. A natural disaster could have immediate  and lasting effects on farm productivity,
which could not be offset by using more inputs, as it could by farmers with more financial
resources.
This paper focusses on the first of these arguments for lower price responsiveness  by
-5-poor farmers, although  we recognize  that all may be important. Some of the others will be
incorporated  in a more general model and tested with a larger dataset as part of the ongoing
followup to the current study.
I.3.  Approach of the paper
The work described  here will begin to answer the questions of how farmers in Mexico
have adjusted to the recent structural changes, and what constraints they face, with a special
focus on poor farmers.  To do this, we first provide an empirical description  of a sample  of
Mexican farmers, according to production, land and household  characteristics. This includes
a comparison  of characteristics  in 1991 and 1993 of the same households  to illustrate how
they have responded  to, and been affected by, changes  in the economic  environment. We
also divide the sample  according to productive  capital asset use to focus on the question of
how relatively  poor farmers differ from the other groups.  (The way in which these groups
are defined is explained  in the Appendix.)
We next formalize  the hypothesis  that farmers with lower wealth are less price
responsive  than richer farmers, in the sense that the former show not only lower levels of
agricultural  production at a given price, but also impaired responsiveness  to changes  is
prices. We then empirically  test the implications  of the model in our sample.  The final
section  of the paper discusses  conclusions  and policy recommendations.
The empirical work in the paper is based on the results of two surveys.  The first was
conducted in  1991 in four states -- Sonora, Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Guanajuato -- for 881
farmers, including both ejidatarios  and private farmers.  Although the 1991 survey was not
-6-specifically  designed to address the issues raised in the current study, it included many
relevant questions, which we exploit here.  It was not designed to be representative  in all
respects of Mexican  agriculture as a whole.
Sonora, situated  in the northwestern  part of Mexico, has received significant
investment  in its infrastructure, including  irrigation and marketing  facilities.  The soils,
except for recent concerns about salinization,  are generally  considered very fertile and the
mix of production is concentrated  in fruits and vegetables more so than the other states in our
sample. Much of Sonora's production  is intended for export to the United States.
Puebla and Tlaxcala, on the other hand, have fewer production amenities. Irrigation
has not been widely available  and the land is of low quality. Farmers are much more
dependent  on grain production and government  subsidies.
Guanajuato  falls somewhere  near the middle of these extremes. In general, the lands
and access to infrastructure  are more heterogeneous  than in the other regions:  some farmers
have more in common  with their Puebla/Tlaxcala  counterparts, while others compare to
Sonora farmers.  The Bajfo valley of our study area is noted for variability  in fertility with
few very poor quality areas.  However, access to irrigation is not as common  as in the
northwestern  states.
In 1993, a limited re-survey for the current study was carried out in Guanajuato,
which was chosen based on its heterogeneity. Although  approximately  95 farmers were
successfully  located during the survey period, only 85 surveys have been accepted  for
analysis due to internal inconsistency  or incompleteness  of the others.  The sample was
selected  via a random draw of the 300 farmers surveyed  in Guanajuato  in 1991, and consists
-7-in large part of ejidatarios. This rather lop-sided  representation,  along with the small sample
size, makes it difficult to draw conclusions  particular to tenure class.  However, the vast
majority of farmers in Mexico are ejidatarios,  so the conclusions  based on this sample are
still broadly applicable. As Guanajuato  is not one of the poorest areas, some characteristics
of this sample may not reflect those of Mexico as a whole, especially  with respect to the very
poorest farmers.
The organization  of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II contains a
detailed discussion  of farmer characteristics,  including  an examination  of how these have
changed, and how their conditions  and practices relate to their wealth.  Section III presents a
theoretical  model emphasizing  the way in which wealth affects the level and price-
responsiveness  of supply, and Section  IV describes  the empirical model used to test this
theory.  In Section V, we discuss the main empirical findings. Section VI concludes.
II.  Statistical  Description  of Farmers
11.  1  Overview
A principal goal of this study is an understanding  of the characteristics  and practices
of Mexico's farmers, especially  the poor, and how these characteristics  and practices have
been modified  by changing economic  conditions. The analysis in the previous sections
implies that in a period of rapidly changing  incentives, the poor-- and especially  those
without access to assets-- would not be expected to fare as well as the non-poor.  But it
cannot predict to what extent this would produce an observable deterioration  in their relative
position in response to specific  changes such as those in the Mexican  economy in the recent
-8-past.  In this section, we statistically  describe the two samples  according to various indicators
of their socio-economic  condition  and farming practices. We compare these indicators across
different groups within each year's sample and across years.  This is intended not only to
descriptively  characterize the farmers in the samples, but also to suggest potential
connections  between observed  changes in the sample  and structural changes in the economy.
II.2  Comparisons  of groups based on access to productive  capital inputs
In this section, we construct an index of farmers' land holdings and access to other
production-enhancing  capital inputs using the full 1991 survey results.  The purpose of this
exercise is to gain a clearer understanding  of the characteristics,  conditions  and practices of
different economic  strata of farmers, by distinguishing  between three broad groups.
We refer to these groups as "capital inputs groups" (CI groups). (See Appendix I for
the definition  of the groups and the distribution  of farmers across the groups).  The capital
inputs to which a farmer has access is not the same as the value of all assets owned by a
farmer (the variable "A" in the theoretical  model below). Rather, the definition  of CI groups
in this section is intended to proxy the potential  permanent income of each farmer by
focussing  on productive  potential. Access to these productive  assets is a more reasonable
proxy for this than would be either current income or total assets, which includes assets that
are not involved  in producing  future income (e.g., housing). Given the absence of any
universally  accepted  indicator of relative welfare or poverty, we judge this to be the most
reasonable  for our purposes. In the Appendix, section  A. 1, we give more details about the
distribution  of farmers across the criteria and motivate  our definition  of the groups.  In this
-9-section, we discuss the  resulting statistical  characterization  of the groups.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics  for our groups on a wide variety of variables.
With respect to cropping patterns, the importance  of corn to producers drops significantly'
as CI increase, with 77 percent of "low" farmers and only 11.5 percent of "high" reporting it
as most important.  This is consistent  with the widely shared perception  that poorer farmers
rely more on corn and beans than other crops.  Wheat, on the other hand, increases
significantly  in prominence  as principal crop as CI increase, from 5.2 percent of "low" CI
farmers to over 58 percent of the "high" group.  Sorghum  is most often reported as the
principal crop by the "medium" asset group, and approximately  5 percent of the farmers in
each group report some type of vegetable  as their most important  crop.
Farmers in our "low" group produce significantly  fewer crops than the other two
groups, which do not significantly  differ from each other.  That is, the farmers who either
have no access to irrigation  and harvest machinery  or whose land holdings are small produce
fewer products on average than other farmers.
An area of particular concern in Mexican  agriculture is access to credit.  The
evidence from our sample  indicates that there is a significant  association  between higher CI
and higher credit per hectare.  Further, the percentage  of farmers who ask for credit that
actually receive it rises with C1 group, from 58 percent for the "low" group to 79 percent for
the "high," while the percentage that reports problems with obtaining credit drops
' Statistical  tests are conducted in pairs of asset groups.  Differences in means are tested for value variables
using SAS' Proc Test.  For frequencies, a method described in Fleiss (1973) is used.
-10-significantly  as CI increase. 2 The farmers receiving  higher credit and reporting fewer
problems in getting it are the ones with access to irrigation  or harvest machinery  or who own
or work larger parcels of land. 3
The dependence  of farmers on the labor market is also shown in Table 1.  A
significantly  larger proportion hires labor as CI increase, and the "high" group hires
significantly  more workers on average than either other group.  This may reflect greater land
sizes and therefore scale of operation,  or perhaps a greater production of cash crops such as
vegetables, which are often hand-picked. It may also just reflect a less binding financial
constraint on hiring.  An interesting  result is the lack of statistical  difference in the wages
paid by all three groups, which seems to indicate a well-functioning  rural labor market.
The proportion of farmers who purchase seeds, use fertilizer, use pesticides,  and
prepare soil with a tractor increases  with CI group.  The percentage that intercrop, often
thought to be associated  with poorer farmers, decreases with CI group.  Thus the farmers
who have larger land holdings or better access to large-scale  capital more often use other
variable inputs that generally  increase  productivity. Many fewer "low" Cl farmers purchase
seeds and use pesticides than in the other two groups.  These are inputs not necessarily
limited to large-scale operations for effectiveness,  so farm size probably has less influence
than the conditions that lead to farmers having no irrigation  and no harvest machinery. On
2 A problem  is indicated  by any  of several  responses  by the farmer,  including:  asked  for credit,  but  was
rejected; received  less than requested;  did not apply  because  interest rate  is too high, or did not know  how  to
obtain  credit, or it was not available  in the farmer's area.
3  Unfortunately,  we are unable to extend this analysis  to interest rates paid on credit because  many  farmers
are unaware of the rate they actually  pay.  This phenomenon  arises in part from the  nature  of most  ejido loan
arrangements  and  indeed many independent  credit deals  which lead  the farmer  to focus more on what  amount  is
to be paid back than what the implicit  rate is.
-11  -the other hand, it is not very surprising  that a significantly  lower proportion of "low" CI
farmers use a tractor to prepare the ground, as there are economies  of scale for this.
Ownership  of assets such as tractors, farm implements  and vehicles  is also more
common  as we move from "low" to "high" groups.  To some extent, this might be correlated
-12-Table 1:  Comparison of indicators for capital input groups  (values are percentages unless otherwise indicated)
1991
T nw_MP__IL__  _  T-T;_gh  TCt
Principal crop':
Corn  77.3  27.0  11.5  a,b,c
Wheat  5.2  32.8  58.1  a,b,c
Sorghum  3.8  25.9  16.2  a,b,c
Vegetables  4.7  5.4  5.3
No. of crops produced  1.6  2.0  2.1  a,b
Credit indicators:
Credit per hectare owned 2 0.59  1.24  1.82  a,b,c
Ask for credit  27.0  65.9  91.2  a,b,c
Receive credit  15.7  44.6  70.7  a,b,c
Receive who ask  58.0  67.9  78.5  a,c
Report problems with credit  61.7  31.3  11.5  a,b,c
Input usage:
Hire labor  63.3  76.2  84.9  a,b,c
No. of workers hired  3.1  3.0  5.1  a,c
Daily wage (pesos)  19,986  18,656  19,928
Purchase seeds  26.3  84.7  95.3  a,b,c
Use fertilizer  75.7  91.2  94.0  a,b
Use pesticides  39.7  86.1  90.7  a,b
Irrigate  20.9  84.0  91.3  a,b,c
Use machinery  inharvest  8.5  84.2  85.3  a,b,c
Use tractor in preparation  of soil  62.5  96.9  97.3  a,b
Intercrop  19.3  5.8  2.0  a,b
Farm assets:
Own tractor  6.7  36.4  59.3  a,b,c
Own farm implements  6.7  37.1  59.3  a,b,c
Own vehicles  12.3  32.3  70.0  a,b,c
Land characteristics:
Km to nearest paved road  4.5  3.5  2.9  a,b
pct. Irrigated  22.9  68.8  84.3  a,b,c
pct. 'Very Fertile'  6.6  17.4  21.3  a,b
pct. 'Fertile'  51.5  67.6  65.7  a,b
pct. "Poor'  41.6  15.0  12.9  a,b
pct. with Flat terrain  61.0  82.1  88.6  a,b,c
pct. under Cultivation  82.5  95.1  90.9  a,b,c
Education of principal:  36.0  39.8  18.0  a,c
No education  57.7  52.4  40.7  a,c
4.0  3.4  19.3  a,c
Up to completed  primary  1.7  3.7  21.9  a,c
Up to completed  secondary
Beyond_  secondary 
P  Principal Crop refers to the crop which the farmer reports as being his most important.
Credit is reported in millions  of 1991 pesos.
Ct Irrigated and other characteristics  indicate the percentage  of land area, so the figure is an average.
Tests:  a:  low and high groups significantly  different at least 10 percent confidence  level.
b:  low and medium  groups significantly  different at least 10 percent confidence  level.
c:  medium and high groups siguificantly  different at least 10 percent confidence  level.
-13-with reported "use",  which is a criteria of our group definition. However, many fewer
farmers own farm machinery  than use (e.g. 37 percent of "medium" own while 84 percent
use farm machinery),  so the effect is not just an artifact of the way the groups are defined.
Rather, this result may reflect the unique status of ejidatarios. (Generally  speaking,  the ejido
collective  owns the larger machinery  available  to ejidatarios,  who either rent it from the
ejido or share use of the equipment.) A significantly  higher proportion of farmers own either
a car or truck as CI group increases, indicating  that "high" CI farmers also have access to
transportation,  implying  lower transaction  costs.  Along these same lines, we find that "low"
CI farmers must travel a significantly  greater distance  to the nearest paved road than either
other group.
"Low" CI farmers report a significantly  lower proportion of their land as being "very
fertile" or "fertile", and a higher proportion  as "poor."  Further, an average of 61 percent of
the land area of the low CI farmers is flat, compared to 82 and 89 percent for the "medium"
and "high" farmers, respectively. Finally, there also appears to be some positive correlation
between 'high" CI and education,  though not between the other two groups.
II.3  Year comparisons
Because of the recent changes  in the economic  environment, we would expect to see
changes in the behavior  of farmers and in the structure  of the agricultural sector.  In this
section, we report some of the results from the sub-group  of 85 farmers who were questioned
in both surveys. We also relate these findings  to the economic  policy changes underway in
Mexico.  Both the findings  themselves  and conclusions  regarding their causal relationship
-14-with the reforms must be regarded  as only suggestive, given the small size of the sample and
the other factors at work in the economic  environment.
As illustrated  in Table 2, changes occurred in cropping patterns.  There was a
significant  increase in the number of farmers that planted corn and wheat as the principal
crop (government  incentives  for these crops were high in this period), while sorghum  showed
a large decline.  Overall, the number of crops produced  by the average farmer increased.
More of the sample in 1993 produced  vegetables, and the average output of these crops
increased, as well.  The greater diversity of crops was also reflected  in an increase in
intercropping.
Diversification  can have two effects. The first is to increase average  income levels,
when the result is higher production of high-value  crops, especially  fruits or vegetables.
Levy (1991) found that "(d)iversification  is one of the key mechanisms  to increase the returns
to  land," and noted that in the North and Northwest  regions, there was a great deal of this
kind of diversification  in response to market incentives, but not much in other parts of the
country.
Another effect is to reduce risk.  Farmers' perceived risk may have been higher in
1993 than in 1991. One reason is the removal  of the parastatal CONASUPO's  guaranteed
support prices for some crops.  Another  is the reform in the credit markets, which eliminated
the de facto requirement  that all farmers participate in the crop insurance program.
Increased  risk from these sources would be expected  to increase farmers' incentives  to self-
insure by diversifying  their crop mix, as they have apparently  done.
Other changes could be linked to the reforms in the land market. One of the reasons
-15-for the reform program was the hope that it would  lead to consolidation  of uneconomically
small parcels and the development  of a more fluid land market.  And, in fact, between 1991
and 1993, the average size of the holdings  in our sample increased by about 18 percent 4.
Moreover, land rentals doubled, and land area used to produce crops increased by nearly one
hectare (12%) on average.
Some changes are also evident in the factor markets for credit and labor.  Recent
reform would be expected to increase both credit demand and supply.  The supply should
increase because some ejidatarios  can now use land as security, maling them better risks for
commercial  lending (Feder and Feeny, 1991). The demand for credit, long-term credit in
particular, should  increase, since more secure tenure rights enhance the incentives to invest
in property.  Also, a virtual write-off of much of the farm debt held by the government
lending institutions  in 1992 may well have increased the demand for credit by creating a
perception  that debt would not have to be re-paid in the future.  With both supply and
demand increasing, the equilibrium  volume of credit should unambiguously  increase as well.
Indeed, the average credit received on a per hectare basis rose from 1.06 million
pesos (about US$351) to  1.15 million (about US$381) in  1991 values, and the acceptance
rate for credit requests of the farmers in our sample rose from 64 to 83 percent.
Nevertheless,  there is still a perception  among our sample of farmers that credit is difficult  to
obtain.  This is evidenced  by a significant  increase in farmers reporting  problems in
obtaining  credit (from 29 to 53 percent).  There was also a drop in the percentage  of farmers
asking for credit (from 68 to 57 percent.)  While the fall in the number asking for credit,
De Janvry, et. al. (1995) also reported this pattern  of land consolidation in the ejido sector.
-16-Table 2:  Comparison  of indicators for sample  of 85 farmers across years
Indicator  1991  1993
Hectares owned  8.32  9.79
Hectares rented  0.46  0.93
Hectares  used  7.98  8.95
Principal crop':
Corn  30.5%  48.2*
Wheat  3.7  21.7*
Sorghum  47.6  ,24.  1*
Vegetables  6.1  8.4
No. of crops produced  2.28  3.27*
Credit indicators:
Credit per hectare owned'  1.06  1.15
Ask for credit  68.3  56.6
Receive credit  43.9  47.0
Receive who ask  64.3  83.3*
Report problems with credit  29.3 %  53.0*
Labor characteristics:
Hire labor  84.1%  69.9*
No. of workers hired  3.88  8.15*
Production  characteristics:
Purchase seeds  78.0%  69.9%
Use fertilizer  90.2  94.0
Use pesticides  78.0  91.6*
Irrigate  72.0  80.7
Use machinery in harvest  63.0  81.9*
Use tractor in preparation of soil  90.1  92.8
Intercrop  13.4  22.9
Km to purchase  seeds  10.51  8.83
Km to purchase  fertilizer  10.73  9.14
Farrn Assets:
Own home  95.1  100.0
Own tractor  41.5  44.6
Own farm implements  41.5  44.6
Own vehicles  28.0  33.7
Income-related  Characteristics:
Households  with off-farm income  37.8  54.2*
No. of family members  with off-farm  jobs  0.61  1.08*
Education  of principal:
None  58.5%  51.8
Up to completed  primary  37.8  42.2 Vp  to completed  secondcry  0.0  0.0
Beyond secondary  2.4  3.6
* Indicates that the value in 1993 is significantly  different from the 1991 value at least a 10 percent confidence  level.
'Principal Crop refers to the crop which the farmer reports as being his most important.
2 Credit is reported in millions of 1991  pesos.
-17-although  small, is somewhat  puzzling, these results overall seem to be consistent  with a
hypothesis  that the availability  of credit is improving. 5
Labor market conditions  have also changed.  A smaller fraction  of the sample  hired
labor in 1993, which is consistent  with the finding of Heath (1990) that the fraction of
ejidatarios that hire labor is decreasing. But at the same time, the average number of
workers hired (by those that did hire some) increased greatly.  Thus, the net employment  of
workers increased in 1993 to about 2.1 times its 1991 level.  Also, farm households'
participation  in the off-farm labor market increased. The number of households  reporting
off-farm income rose from 38% in 1991 to 54% in 1993, while the average number of
family members  with this type of employment  went from 0.61 to 1.08.  One explanation  of
the increase in off-farm labor is that the rural and nonrural labor markets are becoming  better
integrated.
Farmers' access to other purchased inputs seems to have improved.  The distance
reported to the nearest seed and fertilizer marketing  outlets dropped between 1991 and 1993,
as would be expected from the privatization  and deregulation  of marketing  channels.  The
use of most purchased inputs and improved  production  practices (fertilizer, pesticides,
irrigation, harvest machinery, tractor to prepare the soil) increased, though the rate of use of
some was already quite high in 1991. (The sole exception  was the use of purchased seeds,
which declined slightly.) The increase in the incidence  of use of these inputs is especially
interesting  in light of their higher cost (due to removal of fertilizer subsidies), the stronger
efforts to recover costs of providing irrigation  through higher user charges, and the
relaxation  of the link between credit and pre-determined  input packages. 6 This is consistent
with other findings  that farmers are willing to pay more for inputs when they have more
I  De Janvry,  et. a]. (1995) found that access to credit increased modestly between 1990 and 1994, but that
the volume of credit to the ejido sector declined as loans became smaller.
6  De Janvry,  et. al. (1995) report that in corn production on ejidos,  the use of most purchased  inputs
declined between 1990 and 1994.  Their sample also showed substantially  lower use of purchased inputs  in both
years than did our sample.
-18-control over the quality and conditions  of provision (Knudsen  and Nash, Postel).
Because of problems  with the survey, it is difficult to describe changes in the level of
income received by the farmers.  However, a number of alternative  measures seem to
indicate that, in many ways, farmers are better off in 1993 than they were in 1991. First,
the ownership of assets-- including home, tractor, other farm implements, and vehicles-- has
increased. Second, the educational  achievement  in the sample  has improved, with the
fraction reporting no education  dropping from 59% to 52%.7 While gains in both areas
have been modest, they must be interpreted in light of the short time elapsed between the
surveys.  In addition, the improved access to production technologies,  as well as to off-farm
work, appears to indicate that farmers in 1993 had more options, and were therefore
arguably  better off than before. 8
II.4  CI Groups Across Years
To get some preliminary  indication  of how changes between 1991 and 1993 in the
conditions  and practices depended  on the farmers' access to productive assets, we divided the
85-household  sample  into CI groups according to the previously  described  criteria.
Conclusions  regarding changes  over time for each of these groups are even more tenuous
than those based on the sample of 85, principally because of the small size of the groups,
especially  the "high" group.  Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix  present figures comparing
the groups in the two years. In the paragraphs below, we briefly summarize  a few of the
main patterns that seem to emerge.
The evidence of increased diversification  of cropping is similar for all groups.
7 The education  level used in the calculations  corresponds  to the head of household. In some cases, between
1991  and 1993, the person designated  as head of household  changed  (within the same family), usually from an
elderly father to his son.  Thus, while other household  characteristics  remain  unchanged,  the education  level of
the person responsible  for most decisions  could change dramatically.
I It is not clear what is indicated  by a change in the fraction  of the farm population  that receives  off-farm
income. Lustig interprets  an increase  in off-farm  income sources  as a sign of distress in farm households  in the
early 1980s, basically  a supply-side  explanation. We, on the other hand, tend to view this as a demand-driven
phenomenon,  with farmers  being drawn to off-farm  jobs because  they pay better and are less risky than farm
income. Certainly,  this is what has occurred  in other economies  as they have developed  and industrialized. In
this case, an increase in off-farm income  indicates  an increase  in welfare.
-19-However, the pattern is strongest in the high group, and weakest in the low group.
Consequently,  whereas in 1991 there was little difference  among the groups, in 1993 the
high group farmers were the most diversified  (4.1 crops) and the low group the least (2.6
crops). 9 There were no clear patterns of change among the groups with respect to
intercropping.
In the credit market, the credit per hectare increased for the low and high groups,
while falling for the middle group.  This is accompanied  by an increase for all three groups
of the acceptance  rate of credit requests.  The fraction  reporting credit problems, on the
other hand, stayed the same for the low group, while rising for the other two.
The number of farmers who hired labor decreased in the lower two groups, while
rising in the high group.  The number of workers hired increased in the lower two groups
and stayed virtually the same for the high group.  The rate of participation  in off-farm labor
markets fell slightly for the low group, while rising most for the medium  and rising slightly
for the high.
The improvement  in production  practices was most marked for the low asset group.
This group showed large increases in the number of farmers purchasing  seeds, using
fertilizer, using pesticides, irrigating, using harvest machinery,  and using a tractor to prepare
the soil.  The changes in the other groups were small, though they began from much higher
bases in 1991. Consequently,  the differences  among the low, medium, and high groups
narrowed substantially. The reported distance  to purchase both seeds and fertilizer fell for
all groups.
There has been considerable  discussion  of whether structural reforms hurt the poor.
(For a survey, see Berg, et.aL,  1993) Since our data only covers the period since 1991,
which was well after many of the economy-wide  reforms had taken place, they cannot shed
much light on the effects of structural adjustment  in general.  However, many of the reforms
that affected specifically  the agricultural sector began about this time or later.  An analysis of
I  De Janvry,  et. a]. (1995) found  that  small  ejido farmers  changed  more  of their  area  from  monocropped
corn to intercropping  than  did larger  farmers. By this measure,  small  farmers  became  more diversified  to a
greater  extent  than  large.
-20-the change in welfare of the low-asset  group from 1991 to 1993 may be informative.
On balance, the low CI group seems to have been better off in 1993 than in 1991,
though the indicators  do not all point to this conclusion. On the negative side, the education
level in this group fell slightly  and fewer of these households  had off-farm income.  But,
their production practices improved across the board, their credit per hectare more than
doubled, and the rate of ownership of assets (tractors, farm implements, and vehicles)
increased substantially. These results suggest, though they cannot  prove, that Berg, §L_al.
were justified in their skepticism  regarding the claims that the poor become worse off during
a period of adjustment.
III.  Structural Model
The linkages between a farmer's wealth and supply responses  can be motivated
through various alternative  theoretical specifications. We provide here one simple model that
illustrates that the level of net total assets and the use of productive  capital assets will
positively affect output supply level and price responsiveness.
The theoretical  model assumes that the marginal  cost of credit is not equal for all
farmers but rather that it varies according to the degree of "credit worthiness". Thus, the
marginal cost of credit, r, is assumed  to be an increasing  and convex function of the amount
borrowed relative to the net wealth of the farmer," 0
(1)  r  = r  )  ],  r'  >  0,  r"  >  0,
where K is productive  capital used by a farmer," 1 K, is  capital stock owned by the farmer,
'° See Chambers  and Lopez  (1987) for a detailed  justification  of this specification.
"K  can include, for example,  machinery,  equipment,  land and productive  structures  such as barns or silos.
-21-PK  is the asset price of capital, and A is net total wealth, including both agricultural  and non-
agricultural  assets.  Thus, K - K, is the level of debt of the farmer, which we assume to be
non-negative. That is, we assume that farmers use some capital financed  by borrowing.  The
fact that the function r(-)  is increasing  reflects lenders' perception  of greater risks as the
debt/equity  ratio of borrowers rise and, as a consequence,  farmers with higher debt/equity
ratios are required to borrow from lenders (usually in the informal sector) that are willing to
lend at higher interest rates to compensate  for the risks involved. The greater riskiness  of
lending to farmers with relatively low assets could reflect 1) their reduced ability to
collateralize  the loan; or, 2) the increased  risk that their production will fall below the
threshold  that would be sufficient to re-pay the loan, since fewer productive  assets reduce the
average, or increase the variance, of agricultural  yields.' 2
We assume that farmers maximize  profit and, for simplicity, we postulate a constant
returns to scale production technology. The profits accruing to the capital stock owned by
the farmer, K 1, are given by
(2)  J  - max [ir(p,  w)K  - r  PK(K  K)  PK(K - KI)]
where ir(p, w) is a (dual) per unit of capital profit function,  p is output price, and w is a
vector of non-capital  input prices." 3 Thus, rpK  is the rental price of capital." 4 For
simplicity, let p  be normalized  to 1, so that it can be dropped from subsequent  derivations.
12 In a credit model in which a debtor will default if his income falls below a threshold, a mean-preserving
spread of income will increase the probability of default, as it increases the fraction of the distribution below the
threshold.
'3  A more proper specification is a dynamic model in which savings are endogenous and households can
affect K, and A in the long run.  Here,  for simplicity, we ignore the intertemporal aspects of the problem.  See
Chambers and L6pez (1987) for a full intertemporal specification.
"  This should also have a depreciation component, but the ensuing results are not affected by its omission.
-22-The profit function ir(.)  is linearly homogenous  and convex in p and w.  The first order
condition  of the above problem is:
(3)  -r(p, w) =  r(-)  + r'(  )  (  A
From (3), one solves for K" = K(p, w; K 1, A).  Differentiating  (3), one can obtain
expressions  for the effects of p, KY  and A on K-
(4)  (i)  dKp  2 r_ + r_(K  -1K_)
AXr  +  r  A2
(ii)  =aK  = 1,
aK,
(iii)  oK=  K - KA
Thus, as long as a farmer is a net borrower, i.e. K - K 1 >  0, the effect of wealth on the
level of capital used is positive. To illustrate the ensuing  analysis, it is convenient  to specify
a functional  form for r(.).  For simplicity, we can use the following  specification:
(5)  r=b  A  I  - >  1,  b  > O.
If ,B >  1, then the function r(.)  is increasing  and convex. In this case, expression  4(i),
using (3) expressed in elasticity  form, becomes
(6)  aIlnK  =1  (K  - K1)  alnr  (p, w)
alnp  K  alnp
Using Hotelling's lemma, the aggregate  output supply of the farmer is,
-23-(7)  y  =  K(p,  W, PK;  K 1, A) Tp(p, w).
Also, using 4(ii) and 4(iii) it is clear that farm output is an increasing function  of K 1 and A.
That is, wealthier  farmers produce more than poor farmers if the latter face the same prices
and have identical technology  as the former.  Note that since both ;rp(*)  and K'(*) are
homogenous  of degree zero, y is also homogenous  of degree zero in p, w, and PK.
The output supply response  can be obtained from (7) by logarithmic  total
differentiation  with respect to p,
(8)  dIny  =  aInrp(p,  w)  alnK'(p,  w, PK; KP,A)
dlnp  alnp  alnp
Using (6) in (8) we obtain,
(9)  d  Iny  a lnrp(p,  w)  1  K  - K,  alnT
dlnp  alnp  ,B  K  alnp
The effect of K. and A on the elasticity  of supply can be derived from (9) by differentiating
and using 4(ii) and 4(iii), respectively,
(10)  (i)  d(dlny/dlnp)  =  alnT(p,  w)  1  K2 >  '
dK1 alnp  3 K  2
(ii)  d(dlny/dlnp)  =  dlr(p,  w)  K,  (K  - K 1)  >  0,
dA  alnp  -~ K 2 A
Thus, farmers that have more farm capital and more net assets are more responsive  to price
changes (i.e., have greater price elasticities)  than other farmers.
In summary, this analysis  demonstrates  that farmers' wealth (owned assets) affects
both output levels and the ability to respond to price fluctuations. Rich farm households  are
likely to have higher production and to be more responsive  to price changes.  Testing these
-24-two propositions  and providing insights  about their quantitative  nature is a main objective  of
the empirical work.
One implication  of this is that poor farmers benefit less from dynamic conditions. It
is well known that the average or expected farm income increases with price variability'-.
Consider a farm (dual) profit function  G = G(p, 6) where p is output price and 6 are other
variables that affect farm profits (including  input prices, etc.).  Assume for simplicity  that
only p is subject to stochastic  fluctuations  and 6 is constant.  G(-) is convex in p and
moreover Gp =  y by Hotelling's lemma.  G(.)  can be approximated  to the second order by
using Taylor's expansion,
G(s)  - G(p, 6) + Gp(,  0)(p -p) +  V2  Gpp(, 6)(p  -)2
where p is the average  price.  The expected farm profits are,
E(G) = G(,  6) +  h Gpp(p,  6) V(p),
where V(p) is the variance of prices.  Equivalently  we can represent E(G) as,
E(G)  = G(;, 6)  +  1  p  V(pi)
2f  G7(pq,6)  P  p
E(G) = G(p,  6)  +  2  e(P 6) Po),
where f(p,  6) is the output supply elasticity and p(p) is the ratio of variance to average
price 16. Thus, an increase in the variability  of prices, which should be one of the outcomes
I' This assumes  that supply in each period responds  to the current price.  This is the assumpticn  adopted  in
most analyses  of the effects of price instability  (see, for example, the early works  in this area by Waugh  (1944)
and Oi (1961), or later work by Brook, et.al. (1978) and Just, et.al.(1977)). An altermative  assumption  is that
production  decisions  are based on expected,  rather than realized  price each period, so that as long as the
subjective  distribution  of prices does not change, the distribution  of supply will remain  the same (see Newbery
and Stiglitz, 1981).
6 In this derivation, Gp,  which by Hotelling's lemnma  is the output level, is nornalized to one.
-25-of abandoning  guaranteed support prices and linking  domestic and world markets, will have a
positive effect on expected or average farm profits. But since e is smaller for poor than for
wealthy farmers, the former will benefit less than the latter from increased  price variability.
IV.  The Empirical Model
The theoretical  specification  of output supply for each farm-household  in equation (7)
suggests  that output is a function of output prices, variable input prices, productive  capital
stock and total net assets of the household  including non-agricultural  assets.  We consider
two variable inputs, namely, total labor and fertilizers.  Capital stock, K, is represented by
use of farm machinery  and equipment;  and farm assets, the variable A in the previous
section, is computed as the sum of the value of land, machinery  and equipment, vehicles,
animals, buildings,  and savings, if any." 7 Since we are interested  not only in the effect of
farm capital and assets on the level of output but also on the price responsiveness,  we include
interactive  terms that capture this.  We also include a dummy for use of irrigation as a
determinant  of output and an interactive  term, since it is also considered a productive  asset.
Thus, the general specification  is,
(I11)  yi, =  F(jt,  Whj,  qi,; YK,,,  Ait, Ij,),
where  yh is output of farmer i at time t
Ph is output price
w, is the wage rate
6,  is the price of fertilizer
Kit  is machinery, equipment  and structure (dummy)
1  In cases where the farmer indicates  owning  a particular  asset but does not know or provide a value, the
variable is assigned  a predicted  value based on the results  of regressions  that use the observations  of farmers
with complete  information. Explanatory  variables  in these regressions  include the characteristics  of both the
asset  and the farmer.
-26-Ai, is the level of farm assets
Ii, is access to irrigation  facilities (dummy),  and
Since F(.)  is homogenous  of degree zero in Pi.,  4, we can normalize  by  i and
define pi, = p,,/q,, wit = w  . Also, we specify  an extended  logarithmic  function for
(12)  In yit =  aO +  allnpit +  c21nwit  +  a3DY,  f  a41nA, +  a,sDi
+  a% 3 InpitDIit  +  a,4Aitlnpi,  +  a%51npiDit
+  a231nw,,D', + a24A,,lnwj,  +  a1 5lnwiDI  + ii + e'
where D , is a dummy equal to one for farmers that use machinery  and zero otherwise, Dfi  is
a dummy that is equal to one for farmers that have access to irrigation  and zero otherwise. f
are household  fixed effects.  eit  is a stochastic  disturbance  term.
A few comments are in order about specification (12).  First,  the a  (I  =  3,  *..,  5)
coefficients  are intended  to capture the effects of farmers' capital and assets on the own-price
supply  elasticity. If the hypotheses  presented in the previous section hold, the caj  0  = 3, ...,
5) as well as the 
0 k  (k =  3,  ...,  5) coefficients should have non-negative values.  Second, the
"pure" wealth effects of the resources owned by farmers are difficult to separate from the
productive  effects of resources actually used by farmers since there is a high degree of
correlation  between resources owned and actually used."  Thus, the coefficients  auj  0  =  3,
...  5) and ck (k =  3,  ..., 5) measure both the productive as well as the pure effects that
occurs through the marginal cost of capital.
" The assets  variable is included  as a level, not logarithmic,  form in the interactive terms, making  the a14
and a2. parameters easy to interpret as the change in output elasticity  per unit change in assets.
9 This is a reason why we do not intend  to control for the asset price of capital goods separately.
-27-Third, we have less reliable quantitative  values for farm capital and irrigation than
about whether or not farmers own or use such resources. For this reason we use dummy
variables for these.  Fourth, we allow output prices to differ across households  and thereby
reflect the existence  of transaction  costs in the formation  of effective  household-level  prices.
Household  level prices are thus likely to be endogenous  and need to be instrumentalized. We
use variables such as total household  land ownership,  technology, receipt of credit and
income groups, as instruments. Fifth, given the findings  of other investigators  that education
can affect supply response, we include the education  level of farmers as both independent
regressors and interaction  terms with price and wage.
Finally, the model emphasizes  the relationship  between assets or net debt and the
marginal cost of credit.  This may lead some to question  its applicability  to the ejidatarios
whose credit is often arranged by the ejido authorities  rather than individually. However,
official and most commercial  credit that is lent to the collective  still depends  on the viability
of the group, both from credit history as well as collective  productivity. Further, ejidatarios
in our sample  do report credit from sources other than BANRURAL  and FIRA, presumably
marginal  credit at higher interest rates.
One approach to the estimation  of the model  would be to  use first differences  in
order to eliminate  the household  specific  fixed effects.  A problem of doing this when there
are interactive  terms is, however, that unless the two components  of the interactive terms
both vary through time there will be perfect collinearity  between the combined variable and
the single variable that changes through time.  We did try to estimate the model in first
differences,  but this problem was insurmountable. We thus estimate the model in levels, but
-28-must recognize that this introduces some bias if the fixed effects are correlated with other
explanatory  variables. In future work with a larger sample, we will use other techniques  to
resolve this problem.
V.  Results
Table 3 reports the results of estimating various specifications  of equation (12),
without  a fixed effects variable.  Output level and price are aggregate measures, with the
aggregate output index defined as the value of output divided by the aggregate  price index
(per ton).  Both the output price and the wage rate are normalized  by the price of fertilizers.
We use the total value of assets reported by the farmers, and for capital, we include both
access to harvest machinery, and access to irrigation (both dummy  variables).'  The
education  level of the farmer is defined as the number of years of schooling  which were
completed.
In general the goodness-of-fit  of the estimates  presented in Table 3 are satisfactory
given the rather small sample size.  The F-statistic is highly significant,  and the adjusted RI
is quite satisfactory  especially  when one considers  that cross-sectional  units vastly outnumber
the units of time.  Tests for heteroskedasticity  following  White (1980)  were performed and
we were unable to reject homoskedasticity  at even a 10 percent level of confidence. 2"
Column (i) reports the estimated  coefficients  using a log-linear specification  with no
w Land area used in production  is not included  as a separate  regressor primarily  because  it is highly
correlated  with the value of assets, since for many farmers, land constitutes  the primary asset. Therefore, we
would  expect the relationship  between  output  and the value of assets to be positive,  independently  of the relation
expected  from the theoretical  model. This is not true, however,  of the price-asset  interactive term.
21  Test statistic  is embodied  in a SAS sub-routine.
-29-interactive terms between variables. The coefficient  associated  with the price variable is
positive, but not significant, while that associated  with the wage is negative  and significant  as
expected.  The effects of machinery, irrigation, value of assets, and level of education  are
all positive and highly significant, and are consistent  with the model of the previous section.
The coefficient  of the year dummy is also positive and significant,  indicating  that there was
an increase in productivity  from 1991 to 1993 that is not captured in the effects of the
variables we include.
To allow the wealth variables to affect the slope  coefficients  of the output price and
wage, we include interaction  terms.  Column (ii) shows the estimates  when allowing  only
machinery  and the value of assets to affect both the level of supply and the responsiveness  of
supply to price and wage changes.  (That is, irrigation  and level of education  are dropped
from this specification.) Farmers with access to machinery  for harvest have positive and
significant  price responsiveness  in comparison  to those without this access.  Further, the
greater the value of the farmer's assets, the greater his price responsiveness. In fact, as
shown in table 4, farmers with access to machinery  are the only ones that exhibit a positive
and significant  response to price changes, and this responsiveness  increases  both in size and
significance  as the value of assets increases.
Interestingly,  the individual  effect of access to machinery  on the wage response is
positive and significant,  possibly indicating the replacement  of machinery  for human labor.
In addition, the effect of higher assets on wage responsiveness  is low, positive, but
insignificant,  indicating  virtually no effect.  In fact, the estimated  elasticities  given in table 4
show that it is farmers who do ng.l  have access to machinery  for harvest who have the
-30-significant  negative response  to wage changes, and that this response  varies little with
increases in assets.'
Finally, we note that access to machinery  and the value of a farmer's assets continue
to have positive and significant  independent  effects on output as reflected by the coefficients
on the non-interactive  terms.  This means that their effect on output is not limited to their
effect on the price and wage variables.
Column (iii) of table 3 displays  estimates  allowing  both irrigation and the education
level of the farmer to enter as independent  regressors and in interaction  terms, otherwise
maintaining  the specification  of column (ii).  Farmers with access to harvest machinery
exhibit positive and significant  price responsiveness,  as do those with access to irrigation.
Higher asset values contribute to greater responsiveness,  while the level of a farmer's
education  apparently  does not contribute  significantly. In table 4, in fact, the most
significant  supply  responsiveness  to changes in output prices arises from farmers with bQIh
harvest machinery  and irrigation and who fall in the highest tercile of asset values.  For
lower asset values, the response is less significant. No other set of farmers exhibits a
significant  positive response to output prices, and those with neither machinery  nor irrigation
show a negative response. 23
Further, while higher education  levels and access to irrigation  demonstrate  the
22  The output price and wage elasticities  of table 4 are calculated  for groups of farmers  based on the value
of their assets. Using the entire sample  of farmers from 1991 (approximately  880), the sample is sorted by
increasing  assets, divided  into thirds, and assigned  by these  terciles into an asset 'group.
23 While  we expect the farmers  with little access to productive  assets to show a lower price elasticity,  we
are skeptical  of the finding of a negative  value, or one that does not differ significantly  from zero.  We will
investigate  this further with a larger sample.
-31-negative relationship  we might expect with the wage, the effects are not significant.
However, the positive impact  of both access to harvest machinery  and higher value of assets
that was found in column (ii) is again apparent, although  in this case both are significant.
The resulting  elasticity estimates  indicate,  however, that all farmers exhibit some negative
response to increases  in wages, with the most significant  response arising from farmers
without  access to harvest machinery  or who fall in the lowest asset groups.  These are
presumably  the farmers who depend the most on hired and own labor to harvest their
production.
To summarize, in all specifications,  the impact of higher asset values is positively and
significantly  related to higher output levels and, in the two specifications  that test this, to
greater price responsiveness. This is consistent  with the predictions  of the theoretical  model.
VI. Conclusions
One purpose of this study was to monitor the condition  of Mexican  farmers (with
special focus on the poor) during a period of rapidly changing  policy environment. This was
done by re-examining  "baseline" data from a large survey in 1991, and by comparing  the
results from a re-survey of a smaller sample  of these farmers in 1993 with their responses  in
1991. These data have a number of limitations,  including  the smaller size and geographically
more homogeneous  nature of the 1993 sample, as well as problems  inherent to panel survey
data. The results must be interpreted  with some caution. Nonetheless,  a number of
interesting, if tentative,  conclusions  emerge from this analysis.
From the large 1991 sample, it appears that the farmers with more limited use of
-32-productive  capital assets (the "low capital input" group) were more likely to grow corn as
their principal crop, and grew fewer crops on average, than the other farmers.  They also
had less access to and more problems with credit, and were less likely to use purchased
inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides,  or to use a tractor for soil preparation. Their
land was of lower quality on average, and their educational  level lower.
The comparison  across years for the sub-sample  indicates that in general, conditions
have improved  for the average farmer in the sample  area.  Cropping  patterns have become
more diversified. The average size of land holding has increased. The average farmer
receives more credit in real terms than in 1991. More farm households  receive income from
off-farm work.  Purchased  inputs have become more accessible, with a consequent  rise in the
incidence  of use.  Asset ownership and educational  attainment  have also improved modestly.
Conclusions  based on comparisons  of the "CI groups" across time must be looked upon as
even more tentative  than those using the whole sub-sample. But what this comparison
indicates  is that in several ways, the "low" group fared as well or better than the other
groups.  The evidence includes their increased use (more so than the other groups) of credit,
irrigation, machinery, and purchased  inputs, as well as their greater asset ownership. On the
other hand, the level of educational  achievement  fell for this group, and fewer had off-farm
income than in 1991.
-33-Table 3: Instrunental-variable  estimates of output supply equation (in natural logs) 1991 and 1993 data
Variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)
Intercept  -4.80  -6.22  -5.68
(-2.28)**  (-1.70)*  (-.91)
Predicted  price  1.33  -2.17  -7.40
(1.43)  (-1.26)  (-2.32)**
Predicted  price and Machinery'  4.11  5.56
(2.49)**  (1.97)*
Predicted  price and Asset value  1.00  1.61
(2.11)**  (1.66)*
Predicted  price and Irrigation'  3.23
(1.87)*
Predicted  price and Education  level  .256
(.76)
Real wage  -1.83  -2.83  -3.10
(-3.27)***  (-2.87)***  (-1.78)*
Real wage and  Machinery'  3.25  2.05
(3.13)***  (1.71)*
Real wage and  Asset value  .137  .513
(1.21)  (2.69)***
Real wage and  Irrigation'  -.273
(-.14)
Real wage and  Education  level  -.003
(-.06)
Dummy: Use machinery  in harvest  1.26  11.77  6.52
(3.07)***  (3.10)***  (1.48)
Asset value  .573  .603  .962
(4.19)***  (4.57)***  (4.11)***
Dummy: Irrigation  .718  -.747
(2. 10)**  (-.11)
Education  level (# years)  .365  .239
(2.16)**  (.51)
Dummy: Year  .484  .274  .454
(1.93)*  (1.55)  (1.89)*
Number  of observations  74  159  75
F-statistic  15.86  18.86  10.56
Adjusted  R'  .58  .50  .73
Output  price, wage, asset value and education  levels  are expressed  in natural logs except  in the case of
interaction  terms, when asset value and education  are expressed  in levels.
' indicates  term is in Dummy variable form.  *  significant  at 10 %
t-statistics  in parentheses  *'  significant  at 5 %
***  significant at  1 %
-34-Table 4.  Elasticities of output supply
Column (ii) of table 3:
Asset group  Farmers  with  Farmers  without
harvest machinery  harvest machinery
Output price
'low'  group  1.97  -2.14
(3.10)  (-1.25)
"medium" group  2.07  -2.05
(3.28)***  (-1.22)
"high" group  2.53  -1.50
(3.89)***  (-.98)
Wage
"low" group  0.429  -2.83
(1.13)  (-2.87)**
"medium" group  0.442  -2.81
(1.17)  (-2.86)**
'high"  group  0.504  -2.74
(1.34)  (-2.78)**
Column  (iii) of table  3:
Asset group  Farmers with  Farmers with  Farmers without  Farmers with
machinery and  machinery but not  machinery but with  neither machinery
irrigation  irrigation  irrigation  nor irrigation
Output price
'low"  group  1.61  n.a.  -3.86  -6.98
(1.26)  (-1.35)  (-2.32)*
"medium'  group  1.81  -1.17  -3.55  -7.11
(1.47)  (-.65)  (-1.27)  (-2.27)+*
'high"  group  2.87  -0.698  -2.49  -6.72
(2.65)**  (-.37)  (-.88)  (-2.19)*
Wage
'low"  group  -1.31  n.a.  -3.36  -3.09
(-2.20)  (-3.01)***  (-1.77)
"medium" group  -1.26  -.994  -3.29  -3.05
(-2 1 1)*  (-.S0)  (-2.96)**  (-1.75)
'high'  group  -1.01  -.803  -2.94  -2.97
(-1.66)  (-.41)  (-2.63)**  (-1.70)
-35-The second goal of this study was to examine empirically  the relation between assets
and the supply function. Using a production model focussing  on capital as a productive  input,
it was shown that both the level of supply and the responsiveness  (elasticities)  to changing
input and output prices should be expected to depend on the farmer's total net asset position,
as well as use of productive capital.  Empirically,  regression  analysis using data from the
surveys shows  that farmers with higher overall values of assets and who use productive
assets such as machinery  and irrigation have statistically  significant  responsiveness  with
respect to price changes, while farmers without  access to these assets do not.
There may appear to be some inconsistency  between a finding that the low asset
group is less capable of adapting to changing  incentives  on the one hand, and on the other,
the finding  that they have held their own or become  better off vis-a-vis the other groups
during a period of rapid change.  It is possible  that with a larger sample, this finding would
not hold up. (As noted earlier, conclusions  based on the dividing the small sample  into the
groups are quite tentative, given the small size of each group.)  This will be further explored
when a larger sample is available.
However, an alternative  explanation  of this finding is that, ceteris  paribus,  the low
group cannot adjust very well to incentive  changes, but that other things were not equal
during this period.  In fact, it is probable  that they were disproportionately  aided by the rural
programs of the government,  such as Solidaridad,  and by other reforms such as in land
tenure, which were intended to improve access to credit for this group.  To the extent that
these programs succeeded  in giving the poor access to credit, either directly or by acting in
some sense as surrogates  for productive  assets, they may have improved the ability of poor
-36-farmers to deal with change.
The findings  of this study are germane to several policy issues.  One is the question
of whether the goals of the ongoing  reforms in Mexican  agriculture are being met.
Tentatively,  the answer seems to be that by and large, they are.  But the finding that farmers
without access to certain productive  assets are less responsive  to changes in incentives  raises
a warning flag that they may not be able to take full advantage  of the opportunities  presented
by the reforms.  They may require some assistance, particularly  in order to have better
access to the credit market.  This may buttress the case for an income support model of
assistance (in place of crop price supports), since guaranteed  payments not dependent  on the
vagaries of production could act as a signal of credit-worthiness  similar to asset ownership or
use.  It also supports a continuation  of the reforms of the rural financial  and land tenure
systems which have in the past impeded the access of some farmers -- especially  ejidatarios -
- to credit, and have reduced farmers' flexibility  to cope with change.
Finally, this may also argue that a redesign of the government's agricultural  research
and extension services would improve both equity and efficiency. Historically, these services
have focussed  disproportionately  on large-scale  irrigated farmers.  Evidence  that farmers with
limited access to productive  assets have more difficulty  adjusting  to changed incentives
indicates that reorientation  to increase their access would improve the efficient adjustment  of
the sector as a whole.  This could be done by subsidizing  their access to private sector
providers through direct payment to providers (the "Chilean model") or vouchers, or by
channeling  funds through municipalities  (the "Colombian  model") or by some other
mechanism.
-37-Appendix
A. 1  Definition  of Capital Inputs Groups
The characteristics  chosen to define the CI groups are important both for achieving
higher agricultural  yields and because they reflect the heterogeneity  of our sample of
farmers.  In our judgement, these are more likely to be indicative  of permanent income
potential than would be measures  of more temporary status, such as current income or
consumption,  which in any case is not included  in our data.  The characteristics  we chose are
particularly important  in the context of Mexican  agriculture.  These characteristics  include
size of land holdings, which is linked to the economies-of-scale  issues intrinsic to the mini-
findia/lati-fundia distinction. In addition, we focus on irrigation and capital used on the land
because of their ties to infrastructure  and credit availability,  two important  issues in Mexico.
Although  water may appear to be a variable factor of production irrigation  is treated as a
capital input in this context, since the variable cost is quite small relative to initial investment
and the services of the investment  extend over a long time horizon.
Just under 750 farmers are included  in our analysis and are divided according to the
following  criteria.  Farmers who have access to neither irrigation nor harvest machinery  Ql
whose land holdings  are no greater than the first-quartile  level are placed in the "low" Cl
group.  One exception  to this is any farmer with over 40 head of cattle, for whom, as cattle
ranchers, neither irrigation nor harvest machinery  would be expected to play an important
role in production. These farmers are placed in the "high" group.
Farmers who report access to either or both of the assets but whose land hcldings are
no greater than the third-quartile  are assigned to the "medium" group.  Their productive
39potential  is greater than that of the farmers without  irrigation or harvest machinery, but may
be limited by land holdings.
Finally, farmers with land holdings  over the third-quartile  or farmers who own more
than 40 head of cattle (ranchers) are placed in the "high" group.  They may have one or both
assets (irrigation  and harvest machinery)  but by virtue of their size have greater potential  for
output.  These large-scale farmers and ranchers are included in our "high" Cl group.  After
applying  these criteria to the sample, approximately  the same number of farmers fall into the
"low" and "medium" groups, leaving about 20 percent of the sample classified  as "high."
In Table Al,  we show the distribution  of these characteristics. First, the number of
farmers reporting access to neither, one, or both irrigation  and machinery  in harvest.  There
are 744 farmers included in our analysis, so just under one-third report no access to either,
and almost half have just one.
Second,  we give an indication  of farm sizes in our sample.  The distribution  yields a
first-quartile  level of 3.55 hectares  and a third-quartile  of 12 hectares.  According to a survey
of literature on Mexican agriculture, a mini-.fundia  could be described  as a farm consisting
anywhere  from 2 to 4 hectares.  (See, for example, Heath, 1990) A threshold  of 3.55
hectares to define the low group is therefore not inconsistent  with general thinking on what is
a poor farm.  The third-quartile  level will also play a role in our group criteria; beyond this
level, farms are considered large.  While this is somewhat  arbitrary, it does arise from a
sample  of almost 750 farmers from four rather distinct states in Mexico.  Further, we
perform sensitivity  analysis of our groups with respect to this bound, and the overall
distribution  of farmers changes  little, with up to 40 hectares  used as a bound.  Thus, we use
40the third-quartile  level in our group criteria.
The results of applying  these criteria are shown in Table Al.  As mentioned, these
groups are formed for the purpose of illustration,  and represent only one possible set.  There
are numerous  other criteria possible, including  production-related  variables, farmer
education,  consumption  patterns, and asset or income values.
To examine how closely our criteria conform to another possible  welfare measure, in
Table A2 we give a correspondence  between "asset group" and "income  group."  Farmers
were asked in the 1991 survey to categorize  their average monthly  income according to the
four choices shown in the table.  There are three principal reasons why we chose alternative
criteria for our farm groups.  First, the opinion  of the Mexican  academics  who organized the
survey was that the farmers had purposely understated  their income for fear of adverse
consequences  and that this had compromised  the accuracy of the variable.  Second, the goal
of this study is an understanding  of the constraints faced by Mexican farmers in responding
to prices.  A classification  of farmers based on production-related  characteristics  would thus
be more illustrative  in this context. Third, welfare is most appropriately measured  by
relatively  permanent characteristics  that do not fluctuate  greatly over time as does current
income. However, we provide the figures in Table A2 to demonstrate  the level of
"agreement"  between the two classifications. The proportion of farmers reporting income in
either of the lowest two groups falls as assets increase, from 95.1 percent for the "low"
group to 49.3 percent for the "high."  In contrast, the proportion  in each of the two highest
income groups rises with assets.
41Table Al:  Description of criteria for CI groups for full 1991 sample
Indicator  1991
Incidence  of Assets:
(Number  of farmers)
With no irrigation  and no machinery  in  236
harvest
With both "assets"  159
With only I of these assets  349
Land size distribution: (hectares)  level  average
1st quartile  3.55  1.73
2nd quartile  7.0  5.17
3rd quartile  12.0  9.72






'CI  groups were defined along the following  criteria:
Low:  Have none of the two assets (irrigation, use of machinery  in harvest)
OR land size is no greater than first quartile.
Farmers may not have more than 40 head of cattle.
Medium:  Have one of both of the two assets but land size must fall in first three
quartiles.
High:  Have both assets OR land size falls in highest quartile,
OR have more than 40 head of cattle (ranchers).
42Table A2:  Comparison of CI and income groups for full sample of farmers
Monthly income in  Monthly income  Low  Medium  High
pesos (1991 values)  in US dollars
0 to 350,000 pesos  0 to $113  58.2%  37.5  14.3
350,000 to 1,100,000  $113 to $355  36.9  38.2  35.0
1,100,000 to 2,500,000  $355 to $806  3.7  17.5  19.3
over 2,500,000  over $806  0.7  6.7  31.4
Note:  Only income groups are available from the survey, not levels, so it was not possible
to calculate income per capita in the household.
43A.2  CI groups for sub-sample  of 85 across years
The criteria described in the previous section were applied to the small sample of
farmers for which both years of data are available. The hope was that changes for the poor
could be observed and compared to changes for other groups of farmers.  To some extent,
that is possible, but there is little statistical  significance  in the results.  The tables are
presented  here to illustrate the limitations  of the small sample size, but also provide some
useful information  on the effects of reforms on the poor.
Table A3 gives a summary  of the characteristics  of the sub-sample  of farmers in each
year.  The criteria on land-holdings  are maintained  from the larger sample in absolute  levels.
That is, 3.55 hectares  is still the critical value for small farmers, and 12 hectares for large,
even though these figures do not represent the first and third quartiles of the smaller sample.
Table A4 repeats the analysis of Table 1 for these groups, conducting  statistical  tests
on both within-year  figures and across the two years.  Highlights  of the results were given in
the text and are not repeated here.
44Table A3:  Description of criteria for CI groups
Indicator  1991  1993
No. of farmers:
With no irrigation and no machinery  used  18  7
in harvest
With both "assets"  46  59
With only 1 these assets  18  17
Land size distribution:
(number of farmers)
under 3.55 ha.  5  9
between 3.55 and 12 ha.  72  66
over 12 ha.  5  8
CI groups:' (No. of farmers)
Low  20  16
Medium  58  60
High  4  7
CI groups were defined along the following  criteria:
Low:  Have none of the two assets (irrigation, use of machinery  in harvest)
OR land size is no greater than 3.55 hectares.  Farmers may not have
more than 40 head of cattle.
Medium:  Have either or both of the assets, but land size must be no greater
than 12 hectares.
High:  Have both assets OR land size is greater than 12 hectares
OR have more than 40 head of cattle (ranchers).
Note:  In full sample from 1991, 3.55 hectares  represents the first quartile of farm
sizes, and 12 hectares the third quartile.
45Table  A4:  Comparison  of indicators  for  CI  groups,  by year
1991  within  1993  within
year  year
Low  Medium  High  tests  Low  Medium  High  tests
Principal  crop:
Corn  75.0%  17.2  0.0  a,b  56.3  46.7*  57.1
Wheat  0.0  5.2  0.0  25.1*  21.7*  14.3
Sorghum  15.0  56.9  75.0  a,b  6.3  33.4*  0.0*  b
Vegetables  5.0  6.9  0.0  6.3  8.3  14.3
No.  of crops produced  2.0  2.4  2.0  b  2.6*  3.3*  4.1*  b
Credit  indicators:
Credit per ha.  owned2 0.24  1.19  1.53  b  0.53  1.06  2.38  a,c
Ask  for credit  60.0  69.0  100.0  50.0  56.7  71.4
Receive credit  30.0  46.6  75.0  31.3  50.0  57.1
Receive who  ask  50.0  67.5  75.0  62.5  88.1  80.0
Report  problems  with  credit  50.0%  24.1  0.0  b  50.0  56.7*  28.6
Input usage:
Hire  labor  85.0  84.5  75.0  68.8  66.7*  100.0
No.  of workers hired  2.65  3.70  11.25  5.49*  8.30*  11.47  b
Purchase seeds  35.0%  91.4  100.0  a,b  56.3  73.3*  71.4
Use fertilizer  70.0  96.6  100.0  b  87.5  95.0  100.0
Use pesticides  35.0  91.4  100.0  a,b  68.8*  96.7  100.0  b
Irrigate  10.0  93.1  75.0  a,b  56.3*  86.7  85.7  b
Use machinery in harvest  10.0  78.9  100.0  a,b  50.0*  88.3  100.0  a,b
Use tractor  to prepare soil  60.0  100.0  100.0  b  75.0  96.7  100.0  b
Intercrop  35.0  5.2  25.0  b  25.0  21.7*  28.6
Farm  Assets:
Own tractor  10.0  50.0  75.0  a,b  18.8  45.0  100.0  a,c
Own  farm implements  10.0  50.0  75.0  a,b  18.8  45.0  100.0  a,c
Own vehicles  10.0  31.0  75.0  a  37.5*  30.0  57.1
Km  to purchase seeds  11.1  9.9  18.0  5.3  10.3  4.9  b,c
Km to purchase  fertilizer  14.9  10.1  5.8  a,b  9.9  9.4  5.4  c
Education  of principal:
No education  60.0%  58.6  50.0  73.3  49.2  42.9
Up to completed p  40.0  39.6  0.0  20.0  50.9  28.6  b
Vp to completed  secondary  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Beyond secondary  0.0  0.0  50.0  a,c  6.7  0.0  28.6  c
Income-related  Characteristics:
Households  with Off-farm  45.0%  32.8  75.0  31.3  56.7*  85.7  a
income
No.  of family members with  0.70  0.50  1.75  a,c  0.44  1.17*  1.86  a,b
off-farm jobs
I Principal Crop  refers to the crop which the farmer  reports as being his most important.
2 Credit  is reported  in millions of  1991 pesos.
Test codes:
a:  low and high groups  are significantly  different at least  10% confidence  level,
b:  low and medium
c:  medium and high
1993 value is significantly different  from  1991 value.
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